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RECENT DECISIONS
TRUSTS-CONSTRUCTION OF TRUST INSTRUMENTS--INTENTION OF THE
TRUSTOR-Trustor named as beneficiaries under the trust certain relatives
or their surviving issite. Subsequently an original beneficiary adopted a
son and then died, survived by the adopted son and a natural son. After
the adoption trustor made a will in which she left the remainder of the
estate to legatees described in the same manner as under the trust. The will
also contained language stating that "the term issue herein . . . shall in-
clude the lawfully adopted child . . . of any [legatee]." The district court
decree in an action by the trustee for instructions allowed the adopted child
to share in the distribution of trust property. On appeal to the Montana
Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The word issue is ambiguous and subject
to explanation by parol to determine the true intent of the trustor. Holter
v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 336 P.2d 701 (Mont. 1959) (Chief Jus-
tice Harrison and Justice Castles dissenting).
In the construction of a trust, it is well settled that the intention of the
trustor is controlling.' The intent of the trustor and the meaning of the
trust are to be found from an examination of the instrument itself, and
by the circumstances surrounding its execution.* Where the instrument is
ambiguous, so that the intention of the trustor does not appear from an
examination of it and the surrounding circumstances, Montana law pro-
vides for the examination of extrinsic evidence to determine the true in-
tent of the trustor.'
The court in the instant decision found the word "issue" in the trust
instrument ambiguous. This finding is contrary to two recent Montana
cases. In the case of In Re Miller's Trust' Maude Miller set up a trust by
will, the income to be paid to her sons until they reached age fifty. If they
died before age fifty the corpus was to be distributed to the sons' "issue."
The court held that an adopted child of settler's son could not benefit under
the trust because the word "issue" is generally accepted as meaning natural
children, not adopted children. The Miller case may appear to be distin-
guishable since in that case there was no subsequent will and the trustor
died shortly before the adoption. However, these differences arose after
the creation of the trust and, as the instrument is to be construed by its
terms and the circumstances surrounding its execution,' neither variance
from the instant case bears upon the question of ambiguity.
In the decision of In re Kay's Estate° the court adopted the following
language: "To the layman as well as to the lawyer 'issue' has meant actual
physical offspring.'"
Thus in the Miller and Kay holdings, the Montana Supreme Court
found no hint of ambiguity in the term "issue." On the contrary, both
'RavisE CODES OF MOnTANA, 1947, §§ .efl-401-13 to -18. See also Ephraim v. Metro-
politan Trust Co. of Cal., 28 Cal. 2d 824. 172 P.2d 501 (1946) 1 Comstock v. Dewey,
323 Mass. 583, 8.3 N.E.2d 257 (1949) ; First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Deschamps, 171 S.C. 466, 172 S.E. 622 (1934).
'REsEv CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, §§ 93401-13 to -18.
3R1visaD CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 93-401-13.
4133 Mont. 354, 323 P.2d 885 (1958).
'See statutes cited note 2 8uprG.
127 Mont. 172, 260 P.2d 391 (1953).
'rd. at 179, 260 P.2d at 394.
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cases indicated that the meaning of "issue" was well settled. Faced with
these decisions the majority of the court in the instant case stated: "The
fact that a good argument could have been made on either side of the ques-
tion, before these cases were decided, was sufficient to show that the term
carried with it an ambiguity.'
It is submitted that this theory is without merit. As Mr. Chief Justice
Harrison points out in his dissent in the instant case, the Miller and Kay
cases defined "issue" in accord with the vast majority of cases. The opin-
ions did not pretend to create a new interpretation, but merely re-affirmed
an old one.!
Assuming arguendo that the finding of ambiguity could properly be
made in the instant case, extrinsic evidence could then be considered to de-
termine the intent of the trustor.' The majority opinion relies on the New
York case of In re Nicol's Trust' to support its use of the trustor's sub-
sequent will to show his intent to benefit the adopted child. The Nicol
case held that subsequent declarations of the trustor are relevant to show
his intention at the time the trust was created. The holding is in accord
with the general rule that the construction given a trust instrument depends
u1pon the trustor's intent at the time of creation, and not upon any second
thoughts after the event.'
It seems stretching things to say that a will drawn twelve years later
and after a significant change in circumstances is any reliable indication
of the intention of the trustor at the time he created the trust. To be realis-
tic it is almost certain the trustor simply did not contemplate the possibility
of adoption. If he had thought of adopted children he would almost cer-
tainly have included them. The decision is enforcing what the trustor
would have intended if he had been thinking of the possibility of adopted
children, not what he intended in fact. This may work fairness in an in-
dividual case such as this, but abandons the fundamental striving of the
law for certainty. In the instant case it would be equally logical, though
not as probably true in the usual case, for the court to find that the word
"herein" in the will voices a desire of the trustor to limit the adopted
child to that which is granted him in the will.
The instant case has created uncertainty in an area where heretofore
in Montana uncertainty did not exist. The Kay and Miller cases are not
overruled but their application has been limited by this decision. Hence
it is now almost impossible to predict what construction will be given the
word "issue" in future cases involving wills and trust instruments. Fur-
thermore, by failing to recognize that subsequent declarations of the trustor
may be used only insofar as they realistically indicate his intent at the time
of the execution of the trust, the court has significantly departed from
established trust doctrines. If some later intent of a trustor may be con-
sidered in resolving ambiguities in trust instruments, the door is open to
great uncertainty and endless litigation.
aInstant case at 703.
'Instant case at 704.
"0See note 3 8upra.
113 Misc. 2d 898, 148 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1956).
'Brock v. Hall, 33 Cal. 2d 885, 206 P.2d 360 (1949) ; First Carolinas Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Deschamps, 171 S.C. 466, 172 S.E. 622 (1934). See also 90 C.J.S.
Trusts § 161a (1955).
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It is hoped that when this case is noted in the future, it will be recog-
nized that the court was anxious to reach what it considered a desirable
result." Such recognition will avoid undue weight being placed on the
rules of law and construction adhered to in this decision.
DOUGLAS C. ALLEN
WRIT OF PROIIBITION-JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS-PowER TO
RESTRAIN MINISTERIAL ACTs-The Montana Livestock Sanitary Board is-
sued an order declaring Rosebud County a "disease control area" and or-
dered the respondent to present his cattle for brucellosis testing. Respond-
ent obtained an alternative writ of prohibition from the district court. The
Board moved to quash the writ on the ground that prohibition was not the
proper remedy to test its orders which were ministerial in nature and were
within its statutory jurisdiction. The motion was denied and, after hear-
ing,, a peremptory writ issued. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court,
held, judgment reversed and motion to quash granted. The statute permit-
ting a district court to issue the writ of prohibition is unconstitutional
insofar as it applies to ministerial acts. State v. Montana Livestock Sani-
tary Board, 339 P.2d 487 (Mont. 1959).
The first Montana statute defining prohibition was enacted in 1877
but did not mention ministerial acts.' The Montana constitution was
adopted in 1889. Subsequently the statute was amended to its present form.
It provides?
The writ of prohibition is the counterpart of the writ of mandate.
It arrests the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, when
such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such
tribunal, corporation, board, or person.
That the Supreme Court of Montana is powerless to issue the writ of
prohibition to restrain ministerial acts has been settled. In State ex rel.
Sc.arnikow v. Hogan" the petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to restrain
the Secretary of State from certifying a Democratic nominee for district
judge. The court held that it did not have the power, notwithstanding the
statute, to restrain ministerial functions. Rather the court felt bound by
the constitution to the scope of the writ as it existed at common-law. For
authority the court relied upon two California decisions, Maurer v. Mitchell'
"'As before suggested it is questionable whether the court actually did reach a de-
sireable result; for if the word "herein" In the will is a word of limitation the
court has defeated the trustor's intention by this decision.
'Laws of the Territory of Montana, 1877, § 561, at 184.
2REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 93-9201.
24 Mont. 379, 62 Pac. 493 (1900).
'53 Cal. 289 (1878).
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